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JOURNAL OF CHRISTIAN LEGAL THOUGHT
Abstract
WHAT IS CHRISTIAN LEGAL
THOUGHT?
By WILLIAM S. BREWBAKER III
iscussions about Christian legal thought often
proceed from the twin premises that approach-
ing law and legal scholarship from a Christian
perspective is both self-evidently a good thing and that
it is obvious what "Christian" legal thought is. Neither
of these premises is correct. This paper offers a start-
ing point for addressing those premises by posing three
questions:
.Is specifically Christian Legal thought a good idea?
. What is Christian Legal thought?
. What payoff, if any, might we expect from
thinking about law from a specifically Christian
perspective?
IS SPECIFICALLY Christian I
CHRISTIAN LEGAL
THOUGHT A GOOD inevitable. If a
IDEA? premise that
There are three main objec-
tions to thinking about law and is true, in the
politics from an explicitly theo- the word, the
logical perspective: (1) A "sec-
tarian" approach to public mat- inevitably got
ters like law and politics makes or her most tu
dialogue about political matters
difficult, if not impossible. (2) It connect to
is disrespectful to appeal to prin-
ciples which your fellow citizens
do not share. (3) Religion generally and Christianity in
particular have been the source of significant oppression
historically, and the introduction of Christian thought
threatens a repetition of those negative experiences.
The paper offers abbreviated versions of the best re-
sponses to these objections.The first objection depends
on the questionable idea that there is some sort of ge-
nerically human (tradition-independent) reason that
we can always appeal to in discussions with our fellow
citizens. The response to the "disrespect" argument is









perspective to bear in public than it is disrespectful to
bring a secular perspective that is not universally shared?
As to the final objection, Christians must concede that
people acting in the name of Christ have a lot to answer
for. Whether Christian politics has been more violent
than others is an empirical question; Christians, how-
ever, would do well to be on their guard on this front.
While not directly relevant to the objections above,
one might also defend Christian legal thought on
grounds of necessity. Christian legal thought is inevi-
table. If a person accepts the premise that the Christian
faith is true, in the ordinary sense of the word, then such
a person is inevitably going to ask how his or her most
fundamental beliefs connect to
these matters.
li thought is
rson accepts the WHAT IS
Chrstinfath CHRISTIAN LEGAL
Christian faith THOUGHT?
dinary sense of Rather than offer a defi-
uch a person is nition, the paper offers sev-
eral possible ways of thinking
to ask how his about law from a Christian
amental beliefs perspective. The first is a "the-ology and law" approach. On
se mattersR this view, Christian doctrine
occupies some of the same
conceptual space as economics
or feminism or psychology does in other familiar "Law
and X schools of legal thought. In Christian terms this
means asking how, for example, the doctrine of God, the
doctrine of creation, the doctrine of the human person,
the idea of the fall, the concept of redemption, our idea
of what scripture is, or the doctrine of the kingdom of
God shape our understanding of the world, and thus our
understanding of law and its operations.
A second approach might be called a bottom-up ap-
proach. It would start with jurisprudential concepts like
justice or rights, or equality, and seek to retrieve and
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learn from what Christian thinkers have had to say about
these topics, which are themselves fundamental to con-
temporary legal thought.
A third approach is historical in that it notices in par-
ticular that the church has found itself in many differ-
ent historical and cultural contexts, sensitizing the jurist
to the importance of context as he or she seeks to ap-
ply theological truth and practical wisdom to particular
situations.
A fourth approach-or, better yet, a fourth empha-
sis-takes as its starting point the subject matter of law
as we find it in contemporary practice. It investigates the
relationship between Christianity and Property Law, or
Contract Law, or Constitutional Law, or Torts, or Family
Law, asking whether there could be an intersection be-
tween those topics specifically and our understanding of
the Christian faith.
A final approach is to focus on the Bible itself in re-
lation to law. We might begin with the Bible itself-or
individual parts of the Bible such as the Pentateuch,
Israel's history, the Psalms, the wisdom literature, the
prophets, and the New Testament letters and the gos-
pels-and ask what these specific portions of Scripture
have to tell us about the questions about law in which
we might be interested. Most Christian scholarship is a
mixture of these approaches.
WHY BOTHER WITH CHRISTIAN
LEGAL THOUGHT?
A pressing question to ask regarding Christian legal
thought is whether, at the end of the day, approaching
law in these ways is likely to yield anything of signifi-
cance. The paper argues that the answer to that question
may depend on our expectations and that the default
mode of much Christian legal thinking is too hastily
oriented toward offering a prophetic word to society.
Instead, Christian thinking about law often has a stron-
ger contribution to make in explaining ourselves (our
legal practices and the point of those practices) to our-
selves, and perhaps even to other humans who would
not claim to be Christians.
The balance of the paper illustrates this point by un-
dertaking a short explication of the doctrine of creation
as it relates to law, focusing in particular on creation ex
nihilo, creation's goodness, dominion and eschatology.
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